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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JIOXA C. HUDSOX, 
Plaintiff and Appellailt, 
YS. 
rXIOX P~-\.CIFIC R~-\.ILROAD 
COJIPAXY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7449 
Brief of Appellant 
NATURE OF CASE 
This suit was brought by the appellant, Mona C. 
Hudson, against the respondent, Union Pacific Rail-
road Company, to recover damages for personal injuries 
sustained in a crossing accident. The appellant was 
a passenger in an automobile driven by one Era Jones. 
The automobile and a freight train of the respondent 
had a crossing collision. At the close of the trial the 
court directed a verdict of no cause of action, and this 
appeal was taken. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It will aid the court in a study of the facts to 
know that the motion for a directed verdict was made 
on the following grounds: (1) a denial of any negli-
gence on the part of the railroad; ( 2) a denial that 
the negligence, if 1any, was a proximate cause of ap-
pellant's injuries; (3) a claim that appellant was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law; and 
( 4) a claim that the evidence showed that the negli-
gence of Era Jones, the driver of the car, was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident. (R. 269) The record 
does not disclose the basis for the trial court's ruling 
-it may have been on any one or on all of the four 
points specified. It also will be helpful to the court to 
know at the outset that appellant claims negligence in 
the failure of the tr:ain to give warning of the ap-
proaching train; denies that she was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a mat·ter of law, and in addition 
claims that the respondent had the last clear chance 
to avoid the 1accident. (R. 4) 
There is a conflict in the testimony on some of the 
matters of fact. Where there is a direct conflict, we 
state only that portion which favors the position of the 
appellant. This is done because the court directed a 
verdict against appellant and thus ruled that :as a 
matter of law there was no view of the evidence which 
would have permitted the appellant to recover. 
This accident happened on May 1st, 1948, near 
Logandale, Nev:ada. (R. 52) The day was clear. (R. 
249) The collision occurred at about 3:15 p.m. (R. 
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:2-l~l) The appellant was a passenger in the car. She 
was riding in the front seat on the right hand side. 
She and .Jlrs. Jones were just out for a ride. Mrs. 
Jones had wanted to take ;a gift to some people who 
liYed near Logandale and jlrs. Hudson, the appellant, 
went with her. rrhey had delivered the gift and then 
had decided to go for a ride. (R. 74, 75, 87) Mrs. 
Hudson had ridden with .Jirs. Jones many times be-
fore. (R. 77) .Jirs. Jones was a good driver and she 
\\·as paying close attention to the road. (R. 77, 102) 
The appellant and .Jirs. Jones were talking casually. 
(R. 93) The windows on both sides of the car were 
open. (R. 93) X either appellant nor ~Irs. Jones were 
hard of hearing·. (R. 105) Appellant thought that 
.Jirs. Jones \Yas "paying every attention" to her driv-
ing. (R. 71) By frequently riding with her, the a:ppel-
lant had determined that Mrs. Jones was a competent 
driYer. There had never been any reason for appellant 
to be nervous ·while riding with her. (R. 77) The car 
was going slow. One witness placed the speed at about 
18 miles per hour. (R. 225) It is also clear that the 
driver, ~Irs. Jones, knew of the location of the railroad 
track. The ear had crossed over the tracks just a few 
minutes before. They had found the road they were 
traveling to be partially blocked and had turned around 
within a short distance after crossing the track, and 
were returning to the same crossing. (R. 75, 191, 220) 
The railroad track was a single track. (Ex. 3 and 
4) It ran in a general north-south direction. (R. 54) 
It was essentially straight for some distance before 
reaching the highway. (R. 261) The train was going 
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toward the south. (R. 61) At mile post number 85-1, 
near Logandale, N eVIada, this track crossed a country 
road. (R. 52) The road was winding, but its general 
course was also north-south. The car in which plain-
tiff was riding was going toward the south along this 
road, but as the ro1ad turned to go up over the tracks 
the car would be facing toward the west. (R. 61) Thus 
the road crossed the track at approximately right angles. 
We believe that the course of the road, its location 
and elevation, are of import1ance insofar as the issue 
of contributory negligence is concerned. vVe, there-
fore, start to the north and east where car turned and 
trace t~e course of that road to the crossing. Appellant 
testified that the car had come from Logandale, crossed 
the tracks at the crossing here involved and had gone 
north for some short distance. She said that ''when 
we got down in the ravine, we couldn't get through 
and we turned around and came back." (R. 75) Since 
the jury could have believed this, it is perhaps 
not necessary to describe the area beyond the ravine. 
There is considerable evidence on this, however, and 
we refer to it briefly. Keate, the deputy sheriff, testi-
fied that beyond the ravine, to the north, the road 
would be 1about one mile from the tracks. (R. 58) 
There is a ridge that runs east and west and the tracks 
run north and south. One could see the tracks coming 
into view but because of this ridge, one could not see 
north along them. (R. 64) Then the road dips down 
into a ravine. The sheriff said that a train crew might 
be 1able to look down on the top of the car, but that 
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passengers In the car could not have seen the train 
while the car was in the ravine. (R. 64, 67) The road 
is down in this ravine for about one-eighth of a mile. 
(R. G7) ~\s the road comes up out of the ravine, it is 
more or less facing the track. The track can be seen 
hE>~ad on, but there is a hill or ridge which prevents 
anyone in a car fron1 seeing north along the track at 
this point. (R. G-!. 67) Exhibit 1, ·which is a rough 
sketch n1ade by Sheriff l~eate, shows the road facing 
the track but to the right of the road (north) there 
is a hill shown which blocks the view to the north. ( R. 70) 
The hill can abo be seen in the photographs introduced 
by the railroad. 
The fact that the road is so low that the passengers 
in the car could not see the train while in the ravine, 
together with the fact that even as the car came up 
out of the ravine (facing the tracks) the tracks to the 
north were hidden from view is important because, as 
will be hereinafter noted in detail, there is evidence 
from which the jury could have found that the train 
was behind (north of) the car as the car came out of 
the ravine. (R. 224) In any event the road dips into 
the ravine where the t:rtain crew might have been able 
to see the top of the car, but the passengers in the 
car could not have seen the train. (R. 64, 67) There-
after the road turns to the west to come up from the 
ravine. As it comes out of the ravine the tracks could 
have been seen head on, but a small hill blocks vision 
to the north along the tracks. (Ex. 1, R. 57, 64-67) 
The road then turns 'abruptly and goes parallel to the 
traeks. Exhibit 3 is a good picture of the turn just 
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after the road leaves the ravine. The road then is 
parallel to the track for some 300 feet. (R. 55) It is 
approximately 75 feet from the track along this 300-
foot strip. (R. 55, 150) The road then turns abruptly 
to the right and goe·s· up 'a sharp incline to cross the 
tracks. (R. 55) This also is shown by Exhibit 3 and 
by Exhibit 1 (the sheriff's sketch). 
Insofar as elevation is concerned, the sheriff testi-
fied that the road was considerably lower than the 
track. He was asked : ''And they would see it [the 
train] for this 300 feet that it par1allels the track f" 
And he answered : ''Yes, they would if they looked 
straight up." . (R. 68) At page 67, the sheriff said 
they could have seen the train had it been on the track 
opposite them if they had looked "up at an angle." 
Jenkins, an engineer, testified also that the train 
could not have been seen from the ravine, (R. 152) 
and that the road went up a sharp incline as it went 
up onto the tracks. (R. 154) This incline onto the 
track is also mentioned by Mace, a brakeman. (R. 206-7) 
M1ace also testified that he could see the top of the car 
in the ravine (R. 202) but he did not know whether 
or not he could see the occupants. (R. 203) 
MOVEMENT OF THE CAR AND TRAI~ 
As. to th-e movements of the car and the train, 
t~H~.~e IS some conflict. It IS -clear that the car 
firsJ cross'ed the tracks while it was going toward -the 
north_. The ~ppellarit testified that the car turned 
arourid~in 'fhe ravine. CR. 75, 90) Other witnesses (the 
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railroad crew) testified that they saw the car turn 
around and start back south along the road toward 
the crossing. (R. 191) The car was not traveling fast. 
One of the railroad employees estimated the speed to 
be about 18 miles per hour. (R. 223) The engineer 
who had control of the train ·was on the right hand 
side of the cab. (R. 165) He perhaps could have seen 
to the left, but he \Yas not looking. ( R. 166) The left 
side of the train \\·as being watched by the fireman, 
'and it was his duty to watch to the left. (R. 167) He 
testified that he saw the car turn around near the dam, 
(R. 201) and kept his eyes on the car and saw it 
proceeding along this road and saw it go down into 
the ravine. (R. 202) He said he could see the top of 
the car at all points, (R. 197) and that he did not know 
whether he could see the driver when the car was down 
in the ravine. (R. 202) He also said that he saw the 
car proceeding along the strip parallel to the train 
but that he did not say anything to the engineer; (R. 
204) that it looked as though the driver of the car 
was not paying any attention to the car at all. (R. 205) 
He was asked : ''By the way the car was being opera ted, 
it appeared they had never seen the train 1 Answer: 
"That is right." He never, at any time, warned the 
engineer that the car was approaching the tracks. (R. 
205) Sheriff Keate corroborated this by his testimony 
that when he interviewed the train crew he was advised 
by them that they had observed the car for a quarter 
of a mile approaching the crossing. (R. 60) It thus 
appears clear that the car went over the crossing, went 
some distance north along the road, that it turned 
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around and proceeded back toward the crossing at a 
speed of 18 miles per hour. At least while it was down 
in the ravine the occupants of the car could not see 
the train but the train crew could see the top of the 
car. (R. 198) As the train came out of the ravine, 
the sheriff's drawing, Exhibit 1, shows the road ap-
proaching the track at right angles, but because there 
was a hill to the right of the road the occupants of 
the car, 'according to the sheriff, could not have seen 
north along the tracks, but they could have seen the 
tracks head-on. (R. 64-68) There is evidence from 
which the jury could have found that the train was 
not on the tracks at that point, (R. 104) but that it was 
north, and behind this hill as the car came out of the 
ravine. (R. 224) The car then turned to the left and 
paralleled the tracks for some 300 feet, (R. 55) and 
without changing speed or doing anything to indicate 
that its occupants had seen the train, (R. 205) proceeded 
'at the same speed onto the crossing. The train coming 
from behind the car (R. 224) could only have been seen 
on this 300-foot strip had appellant looked back and up 
at a sharp angle. (R. 68) 
The appellant's testimony is that she did not see 
the train at all until it was right on them, 'and all she 
had time to say was, "Oh, my God." (R. 76) She 
did give a statement to the railroad claims agent in 
which she indicated that she had seen the train for 
some fifty feet before the impact. However, both the 
appellant and the claims agent who took the statement 
testified that he had pressed her to make an estimate 
of the distance, that before any distance was mentioned 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 'lei 
;JJif 
:'he had advised hin1 that the train was right on them 
before she saw it, and that she only had time to ex-
claim, "'Oh, n1y God" before the impact. (R. 96-98, 
129) This ren1ark was not placed by the claims agent 
in the statement which he had had the appellant sign. 
There is nothing in the statement inconsistent with her 
testimony at the trial, except the estimate that the train 
\\·as fifty feet away. The circumstances under which 
this statement was given, as testified to by the appel-
lant and 'admitted by the claims agent (R. 129) are 
such that the jury could have found that her testimony 
at the trial was true and that the train \Yas right upon 
them before she noticed it. (R. 76) 
Insofar as the movement of the train is ·concerned, 
the testimony is that it was moving at a speed of from 
15 miles per hour (R. 225) to 20 miles per hour. (R. 
158) At 20 miles per hour the train could have stopped 
in 120 feet. (R. 169) There is no evidence as to how 
quickly it could have stopped at 15 miles per hour. It 
was proceeding down the straight track with some 
members of the crew keeping the car in sight at all 
times, but without warning the engineer that the car 
was approaching. (R. 192) As the car came out of the 
ravine it was ahead of the train. :Mrs. Hudson so testi-
fied and one of the train crew corroborated her as 
follows: (R. 224-5) 
~r r. Oliver: 
Q. You saw the car again as it came up 
out of the ravine~ 
A. Y.es. 
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Q. Just before it started on that parallel 
strip to go to the track~ 
A. Y.es. 
Q. And to that point was the car a little 
behind you, or a little ahead of you~ [Note: 
Oliver was riding in the cab on the engine at 
front of train. (R. 218)] 
A. It was a little ahead of me. 
Q. The car was a little ahead of you as it 
cam·e up out of the ravine? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Assuming this-this is the bottom of 
the ravine, here is the car as it proceeds back 
before making this turn to the parallel-before 
it came to this point to go parallel with the track, 
you understand this map, I take it 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was right along in here (indicates)¥ 
A. Y.es. 
Q. At that time the train was to the rear 
a short distance? 
A. Y.es. 
Q. Back of the car? 
A. Y.es. 
Q. You are sure of that? 
A. Y.es. 
Mrs. Hudson testified: (R. 104) 
Q. Did you ·ever at any time prior to the 
time when you looked up and s·aw the train, did 
you ever look toward the right to the railroad 
track when you were traveling on that 300-foot 
strip? 
10 
, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.:\. AftPr we caine out of the cut, naturally 
I looked out of the cut, I didn't see a train there 
at that time. The train \Yas coming back of us. 
She might have seen it out of the rear vision 
mirror. I didn't have a rear vision mirror. 
Q. You say you looked as you came out of 
the ravine~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. As you traveled that 300-foot strip did 
you look~ 
A. I do not know whether I looked or not. 
\Yhen we made that turn the train was right on 
us-unless she was looking in the rear vision 
mirror I do not know how she could have seen 
it because the t:ra.in was back of us all the time. 
The appellant testified that she did not hear a 
bell or a whistle. (R. 79, 85, 107) Her hearing was all 
right. (R. 79) The car windows were down. (R. 78) 
They were talking only casually. (R. 93) The radio 
was not on, ( R. 85) and the speed of the car was so 
slow that there would have been no wind noise. (R. 225) 
The car was on a road which under the uncontradicted 
evidence was within 75 feet of the track. (R. 55) The 
engine was equi'pped with a bell, (R. 159) and had an 
air whistle which would give a very shrill sound. (R. 158) 
With the car as close behind the car as it obviously 
was, the physical factors are such as to suggest that 
the whistle was not blown. With 1a powerful air whistle, 
under the circumstances indicated above, the train crew 
who observed the car's approach to the tracks should 
have been able to literally shake it with sound vibra-
tion, and certainly should have been able to bring home 
11 
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to the driver of the car that the train was approach-
ing~ Unless one is to attribute an intention on the 
part of the driver and of the appellant to commit sui-
cide by driving in front of the train, one must con-
clude that they did not hear any warning signal. We 
think that the fact that they did drive up on the track 
is itself evidence that they did not hear ~any signal 
and that under the circumstances they could not have 
helped hearing it had it been sounded. 
We desire to emphasize in this statement of facts 
that the train crew observed the car at all times. This 
is not eontradicted. It is. admitted by the engineer 
tand by the fireman that it was: the fireman's duty to 
watch for traffic approaching the train from the left 
side, (R. 167) that he did see the car approaching; 
that the car did nothing to. indicate that the driver 
had seen the train, (R. 205) and that the firem·an gave 
no warning whatever to the engineer until after the 
car had arrived directly in front of the train and a 
collision was unavoidable. (R. 192) At that time he 
shouted to the engineer to ~apply the brakes. The ex-
tent and nature of Mrs. Hudson"s injuries are not 
rna terial here. 
12 
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ARGUl\fENT 
POIXT I. THERE \Y AS EYIDENCE FROM WHICH 
A JURY COULD HAVE DETERMINED THAT 
THE R~\ILRO.A.D \YAS NEGLIGENT. 
\Y e argue the question of the railroad's negligence 
because it is one of the bases assigned by the reS'pondent 
for its n1otion for a directed verdict. 
The negligence relied upon by the defendant is that 
the train crew failed to give adequate warning of its 
approach. It is our contention that respondent had 
::.:- both a statutory duty and a common law duty to warn 
the occupants of the car of the train's approach. We 
contend that the jury could have found (1) that no 
warning whatever was given and (2) that even had 
the jury believed the train crew to the effect that a 
signal \Yas given, it could nevertheless have found that 
the warning given was not adequate under the cir-
cumstances of this case. 
THE CoMMON LAw DuTY 
\Ve contend that even were there no statute re-
quiring the respondent to give a warning of the ap-
proach of its train to a crossing, it nevertheless would 
have had, 'and did have, a common law duty to warn 
the car of the train's approach. The circumstances which 
required the train crew to give a warning of its ap-
proach are as follows: The jury would have been 
compelled to find under the uncontradicted testimony 
that the train crew saw the 0ar turn around; (R. 191) 
that the fireman, whose duty it was to watch for cars 
13 
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approaching the train from the left hand side, saw 
the car at all times after it turned around; that he could 
see it go down into the ravine, (R. 197) see the top 
of it while it was in the ravine, (R. 198) watch it come 
out of the ravine and ·pull on to the tracks. (R. 198-204) 
The car had done nothing whatever to suggest that 
the driver had seen the train. ( R. 205) ·· Still the fire-
man did not advise the engineer that the car was ap-
proaching. (R. 192) The distance that the fireman 
thus observed the car was considerable. It was in the 
ravine for nearly one quarter of a mile and paralleled 
the tracks for 300 feet after coming out of the ravine. 
The jury could have found that the train was coming 
from directly behind the car. (R. 224) It was above 
it so the occupants of the car could only have seen 
the train by looking backwards and up at a sharp angle. 
(R. 224, 67-68) With the crew knowing that the train 
and the car were thus 'approaching a crossing, the 
crew had a common law duty either to adjust the speed 
of the train to avoid an accident or to warri the car 
of its approach. 
The train was only going 15 miles an hour accord-
ing to one- witness, 'and at 20 miles per hour could have 
come to a complete stop in 120 feet. (R. 165, 169) 
It had a bell and a shrill whistle. The car was only 
75 feet away and while it was slightly ahead of the 
train, (R. 224) they traveled parallel to e•ach other 
for 300 feet. 
Under the view of the evidence most favorable to 
the appellant, the jury could have conclud~d that no 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
signal of any kind \Yas giYen. It rnust be remembered 
that under the evidence, the car was traveling only 
~about 18 rniles per hour. (R. 225) The train was 
going between 15 and 20 n1iles 'per hour. ( R. 158, 225) 
\Yhile the jury could have placed the car slightly ahead 
of the train as it turned down the 300-foot strip of 
road parallel to the tracks, the car still would have 
been within 75 feet of the engine of the train. (R. 55) 
The car "\vindows were all down. (R. 78) The radio 
was not on. (R. 85) The occupants of the car were 
talking only casually. (R. 93) It was a clear day, 
out in the country. (R. 249) It is almost a certainty 
that the occupants of the car did not hear any signa], 
for the car did go onto the track directly in front of 
the train. All of these facts the jury had before it. 
It also had the positive testimony of Mrs. Hudson that 
the bell was not sounded and the whistle was not blown. 
(R. 79, 85, 107) On page 107 she was asked: ''Didn't 
you hear 'a whistle at all~" Answer: "Absolutely 
there was no whistle of any kind.'' On page 85 she 
"·as asked: '' \Y as anything going on in the car itself, 
or outside the car that distracted your attention so you 
~ couldn't have heard a whistle had one been blown~" 
lif Answer: ''X o, there wasn't anything, there wasn't any 
Ur whistle blown.'' On page 79 she testified that she did 
f• not hear the bell or any other sound until just before 
oc: the impact. The jury thus could have believed that 
1 ~ no signal of any kind was given. Mrs. Hudson so 
testified. 
W Taking the view of the evidence most favorable 
at! to the respondent, (which is exactly opposite from 
15 
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what should be done) the best that C'an be said for 
the train crew is that at some distance back from the 
crossing they sounded a standard whistle warning. The 
whistle which the crew said was sounded was a stand-
ard "two longs, 'a short, and a long" and that is known 
as the crossing whistle. (R. 159) The engineer did 
not know exactly how far from the crossing the train 
was when he sounded the whistle, but finally said that 
he guessed he was about one quarter of a mile from 
the crossing when he started to sound the whistle. (R. 
17 4) Even though the car was slightly ahead of the 
train some 75 feet away, (R. 224) and going parallel 
to it for 300 feet, no other or further whistle signal 
was given. The crew did testify that a bell was sounded 
continuously. In this regard, however, the engineer 
said the bell was not 'a very loud bell, ( R. 172) and 
another member of the crew said that you could not 
ordinarily hear the bell in the caboose with the train 
running. (R. 252) 
Thus under the most unfavorable view of the evi-
dence, the most the tra~n crew did was to give a 
standard whistle signal some distance hack from the 
crossing and ring a bell which was not a "very loud 
bell,'' and which could not be heard as far hack as the 
caboose. With a car ahead of the train and approaching 
the crossing, with nothing to suggest that the occupants 
had yet seen the train, and with the tnain crew watching 
the car at all times, the jury could certainly have found 
that the respondent, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have sounded the shrill whistle again while the 
car and the train were within 75 feet of e1ach other and 
16 
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traY~ling parallel for 300 feet. This wa~ not done. With 
a train going· 20 miles per hour, it could have stopped 
in ~~~s than 1:20 feet had the engineer been aware of 
the approaching danger. (R. 169) There is evidence 
that it was going only 15 miles per hour, (R. 225) and 
thus could have stopped in considerably less than 120 
feet. At this slow speed the train could have been slowed 
slightly to await the further action of the car, or the 
engineer, who had control of the signals, could have 
made certain that the occupants of the car bad seen the 
train. Instead the fireman remained silent. The engi-
neer relied on the fireman to watch that side of the 
train, and did not even glance in that direction. (R. 162) 
And they gambled that the car driver would hear or see 
the train. 'Ye believe that this failure of the fireman 
to warn the engineer of the approaching car, and the 
failure of the train crew to give a whistle signal as the 
train and car proceeded parallel for 300 feet, could 
have been classed as negligence by a jury. 
STATUTORY DuTY 
In addition to the common law duty, we also rely 
upon the statutory duty of a railroad to give a warning 
as it approaches !a crossing. At the close of the trial, 
counsel for respondent attempted to introduce statutes 
of the State of Nevada. Since the Nevada law was not 
pleaded, it could not be introduced and the Utah Court 
would be compelled to presume that the Nevada l~aw 
was the same as the law of the State of Utah. In other 
words, where there is no evidence to show that the law 
where an accident happens is different from the law of 
17 
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the forum, then the presumption is that the law of the 
forum and the law of the place where the accident hap-
pened are the same. See Dickson v. Mull,ings, 66 Utah 
282, 241 P. 2d 840, 43 A.L.R., 136. 
In this regard there is not very much difference 
anyway because the Nevada statutes which were read 
into the record in the absence of the jury, (R. 263) and 
our Utah Statute, Section 77-0-14, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, ~are not materially different. The Nevada statute, 
Volume 3, Section 6276, Com'piled Laws of Nevada, 1949, 
required a train to ring a bell of at least 20 pounds 
weight at a distance of at least 80 rods from the place 
where the railroad shall cross any street, ro!ad or high-
way. In this regard it should be noted that there was 
no evidence introduced by the railroad to show that the 
bell which was rung weighed 20 pounds or more. Counsel 
for respondent attempted to get the railroad employees 
to so testify, but the testimony was to the effect that 
they did not know its weight. (R. 159) 
The Utah statute provides: 
''Every locomotive shall be provided with a 
bell and it shall be rung continuously from a 
point not less than eighty rods from any city 
or town or public highway grade crossing, until 
such city or town, street or such grade crossing 
shall be crossed. But except in towns and at 
terminal points the sounding of locomotive 
whistle or signal one-fourth of a mile before 
reaching such gr·ade crossing, shall be deemed · 
equivalent to the ring of the bell as aforesaid." 
Thus under either the Nevada law or under the 
Utah law, the respondent was compelled to ring a bell 
18 
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at lea~t eighty rods before reaching the crossing. Under 
Xevada law that bell must have weighed at least 20 
pounds, 'and there was no alternative which permitted 
the sounding of a whistle. In Utah the bell did not have 
to be of any particular weight, and the sounding of the 
whistle could take the place of ringing the bell. We 
think that the Utah law applies because the Nevada law 
was not pleaded. In the case of Buhler r. llladdison, 105, 
Utah 39, 140 P. 2d 933, the Utah court refused to con-
sider X evada statutes which were introduced but not 
pleaded, and we think that such is the rule which must 
be followed here. It is a well established rule of law 
that in the absence of proof it will be presumed that the 
law of another state is the S'ame as the law of the forum, 
and the court will administer and apply the law of the 
jurisdiction until the law of the situs is shown. Dickson 
v. Mullings, 66 Utah 282, 241 P. 2d 840, 43 A.L.R. 136. 
In any event, regardless of which law is applied, there 
was a statutory duty on the part of the railroad to give 
a warning as it approached the crossing. The jury could 
have found from the testimony of Mrs. Hudson that no 
warning signal was given. (R. 79, 85, 107) There are 
numerous cases to the effect that a jury question is 
presented on the issue of negligence where !a person, in 
a position to hear, testifies that he did not hear a whistle 
or bell. In this regard the case of Earle v. Salt Lake & 
Utah Railroad, 109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877 is in point. 
There the jury had only the testimony of witnesses that 
they did not hear a signal even though they were situated 
so that they could have heard it had one been given. 
The Supreme Court said (R. 114) that this presented a 
jury question. 
19 
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POINT NO. 11: THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE ACCIDENT 
The motion for a directed verdict specified that it 
was made on the grounds that the evidence showed as a 
matter of law that any negligence on the part of the 
railroad was not a proximate cause of the injury. It 
was also argued as a part of the motion that the sole 
cause of the injury was the negligence of Mrs. Jones. 
These matters can best be argued together. 
We readily admit that the jury could have found 
that Mrs. Jones was guilty of negligence in not looking 
for the train before 'Pulling onto the crossing. This, 
however, is not sufficient to demonstrate that the rail-
road's negligence was not also a contributing cause. It 
is not necessary for us to show that the railroad's negli-
gence was the sole cause of the injury. It is sufficient 
in law if we can establish that its neglige:p.ce was a con-
tributing cause. 
If the jury had been permitted to find that the rail-
road was negligent in (a) not giving proper warning 
of the t:r~ain 's approach to the crossing, and (b) in the 
fireman's f1ailure to warn the engineer of the car's ap-
proach, then it would seem to go without argument that 
such negligence was one of the contributing causes of 
the accident. The evidence shows that the car was pro-
ceeding at a slow enough speed, (18 miles per hour), 
that it could have been stopped had the driver known 
of the approach of the train. If the jury had concluded 
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that no warning had been given, then there certainly 
was a jury question as to whether or not the failure to 
give that sig·nal was a contributing CJause of the acci-
dent. Likewise, if the fireman who saw the car ap-
proaching the crossing without any indication that the 
driver knew of the approach of the train, had advised 
the engineer of the train's approach, then the train 
could have been slowed or the engineer could have been 
more diligent in warning the approaching car. Cer-
tainly had the fireman warned the engineer of the a p-
proach of the car, 'and had the engineer then adjusted 
to the approaching danger, the accident could have been 
avoided. \Ve need not here contend or demonstrate that 
the jury would have been compelled to find that the rail-
road's negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. 
The Court directed 'a verdicL In regard to the. issue of 
proximate causation, it is sufficient if appellant shows 
that the jury could have found, reasonably, that the rail-
road's negligence was a proximate cause. We submit 
that a jury could have so found. 
We cite the case of Earle v. Salt Lake if Utah Rail-
road Company, 109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877, which is in 
point on the question of prox;imate cause. The railroad 
there argued that as 'a matter of law the failure to 
sound a whistle was not a proximate cause of the acci-
dent. The Court said, 
"Certainly under the state of the record, with 
a conflict in the evidence as to whether any cross-
ing warnings were giv.en by the engineer, the 
question of whether they were negligent was 
properly for the jury. Defendants furthe-r urge 
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that the evidence is conclusive, that from a point 
on the highway approximately 123 feet south 
of the track, there was a clear and unobstructed 
view of the track for approximately 84 feet east 
from the ·east edge of the highway, that since 
the train was traveling much slower than the 
automobile, the automobile must have traveled 
the last 123 feet before the collision while the 
train was moving on the track toward the cross-
ing in full and unobstructed view of the driver 
of the car; that this in itself was ample warning 
to the driver of the automobile that the train 
was approaching, and therefore his failure to 
heed this warning was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident. . . . It is not the province of 
the Court to say that had the train whistled or 
rang a bell to signal its approach, the driver 
of the car would not have stopped or slowed 
down ~and thereby avoided the collision. This 
is properly a question for the trier of the fact." 
The Court also quoted from Pipvpy v. Oregon Short-
line Railroad Company, 79 Utah 439, 11 P. 2d 305, 310, 
to the effect that the failure to sound a signal to warn 
an approaching car is a proximate cause of a resulting 
collision between the train and the car under circum-
stances such as are here present. 
POINT NO. III: THE APPELLANT WAS NOT 
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
It is this third point upon which we believe the 
trial court granted the directed verdict. The record 
does not show this but the indication from the bench so 
suggested. In this regard we believe that the recent 
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ease of Earle l'. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Corporation, 
109 Utah 111. 165 P. :2d 877, is directly in point. The 
facts of that rase and this are 'almost a direct parallel. 
-·"' Both eases involved a guest riding in an automobile 
which had a collision with a train at a railroad crossing. 
In the Earle case the plaintiff was a stranger to the 
driver of the car and did not know "'hether or not he 
was a careful driver. He, therefore, would have had a 
greater duty to be attentive. In the instant case the 
appellant had ridden with ~frs. Jones on many previous 
occasions and had concluded from previous observation 
that ~frs. Jones was an attentive and careful driver. (R. 
76-77) Her duty to be watchful would thus not have 
been as strict as 1n the Earle case. In the Earle case 
there were cross arms which warned appr01aching drivers 
of the existence of a railroad track. It was undisputed 
that the plaintiff in the Earle case saw the cross arms 
but did not warn the driver that they were approaching 
a railroad track. The court there had a case where the 
plaintiff passenger knew they were approaching a rail-
road crossing, yet he failed to warn the driver. There 
was no evidence to suggest that the driver saw the 
cross arms. In the instant case the evidence is much 
stronger on behalf of the appellant beCJause there is 
affirmative and uncontradicted evidence that the driver 
knew of the existence of the tracks and that they were 
approaching the same. Several witnesses testified that 
the car had crossed over the tracks, gone north along 
the road a short distance (less than a mile) and had 
turned around and was going back toward the tracks. 
(R. 75, 191) Therefore, Mrs. Jones had crossed over 
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these very tracks not more than five minutes before 'and 
the appellant could have safely relied upon the fact that 
she knew the tracks existed. 
In both cases the plaintiff was a guest. In the 
Earle case the "vegetation growing along the east side 
of the highway would somewhat obstruct the view of 
the track for some distance to the east," but for at least 
123 feet there was no obstruction whatsoever and the 
car was approaching at a right angle. In the instant 
case there was evidence to the effect that the tracks 
were considerably higher than the road so that the 
occupants of the car would have had to look up at an 
angle to s_ee the train. ( R. 68, 91) There is also evidence 
to the effect that the car was 1ahead of the train so that 
the train was approaching the car from the rear. (R. 
• 224~: 104) We realize that the evidence is in conflict on 
Jhis point, but l\1rs. Hudson testified that as they came 
out of the ravine she looked at the tracks and there was 
no train there. ( R. 104) Her vision, under the evidence, 
was blocked so that she could not see north along tht> 
track, (R. 64, 68) but on the portion of the track which 
she could see she looked and there was no train. (R. 104) 
Then one of the employees of the railroad \\·as asked 
concerning this matter 1and he testified that he was cer-
tain that when the car came out of the ravine it wa~ 
ahead of the train. (R. 224) We have read the tran-
script of the evidence in the Earle case upon which the 
Supreme Court based its decision. Both that transcript 
1and the opinion of the court show that the vegetation 
growing along the right of way would not completely 
hide the train at any point. It partially obscured the 
24 
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vi~ion of the car occupants, but it did not block it, and 
for the last 1~3 feet tlw view was not obstructed at all, 
and the car was approaching at a right angle. In the 
instant case the jury could have found that vision was 
blocked entirely to the north; that as the car came out 
of the ravine the train was to the north; that thereafter 
the train approached the car fron1 the rear and that it 
was at a higher elevation so that to see it Mrs. Hudson 
would have been compelled to look directly back of her 
and up at a sharp angle. Under her testimony she did 
look at the tracks as the car came out of the ravine, 'and 
there was no train on the tracks. (R. 104) Of course she 
could not see north along the tracks, but could see them 
"head on" as the car came out of the ravine. (R. 64-68) 
She looked and the train was not there. (R. 104) From 
that point on to the curve up to the track crossing, the 
train was behind her and above her. Certainly her op-
portunity to see the train was not as good as that of 
the plaintiff in the Earle case. 
In both this and the E~arle case the plaintiff was in 
the front seat. In both cases the train struck the side 
of the car on which the plaintiff was riding. The only 
points of difference in the two cases are in favor of the 
appellant's position here. (1) There the plaintiff was 
a stranger to the driver and did not know whether or 
not he was careful. Here the plaintiff had ridden many 
times with :hirs. Jones and had concluded that she was 
an attentive driver generally and that she was watching 
the road at this time. (R. 77, 102). (2) In both cases the 
plaintiffs knew that the car was approaching a crossing 
but in the Earle case the plaintiff did not know whether 
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or not the driver had observed that he was approaching 
a train track. Here the plaintiff knew that the driver 
knew of the presence of the tracks and that she was 
about to cross them. (3) There was no evidence in the 
Earle case that the train crew had seen, the car. Here 
the crew watched the car for nearly half a mile as it 
approached the t~acks. (4) There the speed of both 
vehicles was faster so that both needed more time to 
adjust to the situation which rapidly developed. Here 
the train could have been stopped in a few feet and the 
crew was observing the car. The car, had an effort been 
made to warn the driver, could have stopped almost up 
to the point of impact. ( 5) There the view was unob-
structed entirely for 1:23 feet immediately before the 
crossing. Here the train was to the rear of the car 
and above it so that it could only be seen by looking 
back and up at an angle. We simply cannot see how 
the trial court could be susbained here unless the Earle 
case is to be now overruled. The cases to follow will 
demonstrate that the Earle case is in complete harmony 
with earlier cases from this state and with the cases 
from other jurisdiction. 
The court in the Earle case cited and quoted from 
two cases arising out of a single accident. In the first 
case, Shortino v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Company, 
52 Utah 476, 174 P. 860, 866, the court noted the duty 
of the driver of the car. In M ontagu~ v. Salt Lake & 
Utah Railroad Company, 52 U tJah 368, 17 4 P. 871, 872, 
the court noted the duty of a guest. The guest rule there 
set forth was reapproved by the Earle case and is ap-
parently the rule in Utah today. It is as follows: 
26 
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" ... the plaintiff was not charged with the 
san1e ~trict legal duty of keeping· a lookout and 
being wa trhful as the owner and driver of the 
automobile, .Jlr. Shortino. 
''The rule applicable here, which is adopted 
by the Supreme Court of l\[innesota in the case 
of Cotton v. Willma.r & San Francisco Railroad 
Company, 99 ~linn. 366, 109 N.,V. 835, 8 L.R.A. 
X .S. 643, 116 Am. St. Rep. 422, 9 Ann. Cas. 
935, which case is cited and followed in the 
Atwood case, supra, is stated thus: 'The rule 
which has met with general approval in the 
more recent cases made the passenger r~spons­
ible only for his personal negligence, an<:l leaves 
it to the jury to determine whether, under the 
circumstances, he was justified in trusting his 
safety to the care of the driver and not looking 
or listening for himself. The negligence qf the 
drhrer is thus not imputed to the guests or 
passenger, but the circumstances may be such 
as to make it the duty of the passeng~r to look 
and listen and attempt to control the. driver for 
his own protection.'' 
In a third case arising out of this ~arne (Shortino) 
accident, Cowan v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad ()o~pany, 
56 Utah 94, 189 P. 599, 605, /the court _reviews most of 
the Utah cases in great _detail and concludefi by affirm-
ing the rule of Atwood v. Utah Light & R. Company,.44 
Utah 366, 140 P. 137, 139, and the Minnesota cm,se quoted 
above. In commenting on these earlier cases, th_e :Utah 
Supreme Court -said in Earle _case that the rule an-
nounced is ''that .contributory negligence sh_o_uld be left 
to the jury 'unless that question is f~e·.f:r:om substantial 
doubt.' " 
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In the Atwood case the court quoted with approval 
from another Minnesota case as follows: 
" 'We think that it would hardly occur to 
a man of ordinary prudence, when riding as a 
·passenger with a competent driver, who he had 
no reason to suppose was neglecting his duty, 
that he be required, when approaching a rail-
way crossing, to exercise the same degree of 
vigilance in looking and listening for approach-
ing trains that he would if he himself had the 
control and management of the team.' '' 
The Utah court then commented : ''This seems to 
us good sense as well as good law.'' It is this rule which 
was expressly affirmed again in the Earle case. The 
cases from other states are to like effect. In this regard 
we confine ourselves to cases of unobstructed vision and 
passengers in the front seat. 
In Gate v. Fresno Traction Company, (Cal.) 2 P. 
(2d) 364, the defendant operated an electric trolley 
line on regular schedule between Fresno and the town 
of Pine Dale. The line crossed Shaw Avenue 1at a point 
about five miles from the city of Fresno in a level and 
sparsely settled country. The deceased, a woman thirty 
five years of age, was a passenger in an automobile which 
was driven in a westerly direction toward the intersec-
tion, while the trolley car involved in the collision was 
approaching from the south. For 637 feet along Shaw 
Avenue before reaching the tracks there was nothing to 
obstruct either the driver's or the passenger's vision of 
the electrical car. The ground was level, no foliage, 
house or other obstruction of any kind existed. It was in 
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the open country and there was a standard railroad cross-
ing sign. The driver testified that as they approached 
the crossing and at a distance of about sixty or eighty feet 
therefrom they both looked to the right and he looked to 
the left. He further testified that he saw nothing, that the 
deceased said nothing until just before the collision 
when she said, "Lord, there's a car." There WJas a 
conflict as to whether the motorman gave a warning 
signal. When the motorman first observed the automo-
bile the electric car was going 18 or 19 miles per hour 
and when it approached the crossing it had been slowed 
down to 17 miles per hour. The speed of the automobile 
was from 18-22 miles per hour. The court refused to 
hold that the passenger was guilty of contributory 
negligence. 
In Hopkins v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 118 P. (2d) 
872, (California), the guest was riding in the front seat 
beside the driver. The intersection was unobstructed. 
The guest did not look for a train, though familiar with 
the crossing. Having no warning of approaching danger 
he could do nothing to W!arn the driver of it. The court 
said: 
''Defendants also urge that Hopkins was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law. This argument finds little evidentiary 
support. Hopkins was the guest of Johnson, 
and the negligence of Johnson, if any, was not 
imputable to him. Johnson was in no way sub-
ject to the control of Hopkins, nor under his 
supervision or direction as to the m•anner in 
which he operated the automobile .... The de-
ceased had the right to assume that the driver 
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was competent, that he knew the capacity of 
his machine, and that he would not put it in 
a !)erilous position. It follows that we can not 
conclude that Hopkins was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law." 
In Atlanta and W. P. R. Co .. v. McCord, (Ga.) 189 
S.E. 403, the court held that a person riding in an auto-
mobile as the guest of another who is operating the auto-
mobile is not as a matter of law guilty of negligence 
barring recovery 1against the railroad company for an 
injury received by him in failing to observe the ap-
proaching train, although the view down the track for 
over a half mile was unobstructed. 
See also Gorman v. Franklin, (Mo.), 117 S.W. (2d) 
289; Carson v. Thompson, (Mo.), 161 S:\V. (2d) 995; 
Gifford v. Pa .. R. Co., (New Jersey), 196 Atl. 679; Scheer 
v. Long Island R. Co., 34 N.Y.S. (2d) 25; Anstine v. Pa. 
R. Co. (Pa.), 20 Atl. (2d) 774; Valera v. Reading Co., 
(Pa.), 36 Atl. (2d) 644; Wichita Valley Ry. Co. v. Dur-
rett, (Tex.), 17 S.W. (2d) 329; Oulf M. & 0. R. Co. v. 
Underwood, (Tenn.), 187 S.W. (2d) 777; Cox v. Polson 
Logging Co., (Wash.), 138 P. (2d) 169; Parsons v. N.Y. 
Central R. Co., (West Va.), 34 S.E. 334; Koscuik v. Sherf, 
(Wise.), 272 N.W. 8; Chicago and E. I. Railway Co. v. 
Felling, (Ind.), 200 N.E. 441; Finley v. Lowden, (Iowa), 
277 N.W. 487; Frideres v. Lowden, (Iowa), 17 N.W. (2d) 
396; and Lang v. Chicago & N. 'W. Ry. Co., (Minn.), 295 
N.W.57. 
It seems clear that the plaintiff here had no control 
over the car and no right to exercise control. She did 
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not observe the train before the collision was unavoid-
able and she had no duty to observe it. She knew the 
driYer, had observed that the driver was careful and 
attentive. They were not speeding, the driver was look-
ing straight ahead and watching the road, her attention 
was not detracted. She knew that the driver knew of 
the presence of the railroad track. She had observed 
the railroad tracks as the car carne out of the ravine 
and did not see any h~ain there. She then relied upon 
the driver to watch the road and the tracks from that 
point to the crossing, but just as the car went up on to 
the crossing she looked and observed the train and 
warned ~Irs. Jones immediately. It is obvious that she 
could have seen the train had she looked backward and 
up at an angle, but under the Utah cases she had no 
absolute duty to do so. She had a right to rely upon 
:Jirs. Jones watching the road and the railroad tracks. 
LAST CLEAR CHANCE 
If the court were to conclude, notwithstanding the 
above~ that ~Irs. Hudson was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, we believe that the rail-
road had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. It 
t'; is not contradicted that it observed the car approaching 
[J1l the track at a speed of approximately 18 miles per hour. 
The car had done nothing to indicate that the driver 
had seen the train. Its speed was so slow that it could 
have stopped almost instantly. As it continued to !ap-
proach the tracks without slackening its speed, all that 
the defendant would have had to do to avoid the colli-
sion was to give a blast of the whistle. At that point 
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the train and the ear were so close together that even a 
driver who was completely inattentive could have heard 
the whistle. We do not here have a situation of a car 
and a train each approaching the crossing at a rapid 
speed. lJnder the evidence the jury could have found 
the train to be going as slow as 15 miles per hour and 
the car at 18 miles per hour. The jury would have been 
compelled to find that the train crew was Wla tching the 
car approaching the tracks. It would have been com-
pelled to find that the car had not slackened speed or 
done anything to indicate that the driver had seen the 
train. There certainly Wlas a point at which the train 
crew knew full well that the car was going up on to the 
tracks. As the car went up to the tracks it was going 
uphill at a very slow speed. A sounding of the whistle 
most certainly would have stopped the car. We submit 
that the train crew was guilty of negligence in not sound-
ing the whistle at that point, and that it did have the 
last clear chance to stop the car and avoid the accident. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court erred 
in directing a verdict against the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE, 
ALLAN E. MECHAM, 
WOODROW D. WHITE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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